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I. INTRODUCTION
After forty-one years of masterminding the embargo of trade in
technology against the Eastern Bloc, the Coordinating Committee
for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) must decide whether to
dismantle its organization and initiate a new era of free trade, or
maintain the embargo, with periodic fine-tuning reflecting political
and economic changes. The dilemma facing the Committee's
seventeen member-nations arose following reforms which ushered
in new political and economic systems in nearly every Eastern
European nation.2
1. CoCom consists of the following countries: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France,
Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the
United Kingdom, and the United States. Masden, Trade Regulations-Export Controls- CoCom Agrees
on New Multilateral Export Guidelines Allowing Eastern Bloc to Purchase Low Level Technology
Legally, 16 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L 197, 197 n.4 (1986). See generally Haendel & Rothstein, The
Shiing Focus of Dual Use Export Controls: An Overview of Recent Developments and a Forecast
for the Future, 25 INT'L LAW 267 (1991). Haendel and Rothstein's article was released while this
Comment was in its publishing stages. They review the changing role of export controls and reinforce
a number of predictions offered by this comment.
2. N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1989, § IV, at 3, col. I. In early 1989, the Polish government legalized
Solidarity. Id. On May 22, Janos Kadar, Hungary's communist leader for over 32 years stepped
down, and was replaced by a centrist leader. Id. A month later, Poland held its first free elections
since the rise of communism, with Solidarity winning control of Parliament. Id. By the end of the
summer, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, a Solidarity leader, was elected as prime minister. Id. On October 7,
the Hungarian Parliament revised the Constitution, allowing for a multi-party system. The Communist
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While most European communist regimes collapsed, the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) approached reform with
caution. The Soviet government restructured the political
organization and decision making apparatus of the central
government, and improved relations with the West. They then
decentralized the Soviet economy to encourage private initiative.
Presently, as economic conditions continue to deteriorate, the
U.S.S.R. struggles internally to survive, with the latest signs
implying a possible retreat from initial reform policies.
Responding to the rapid changes in Eastern Europe, a somewhat
stunned Western alliance reexamined political and economic
relationships with its former adversaries. On June 1, 1990, the U.S.
and the U.S.S.R. signed a trade agreement with provisions to
include the Soviet Union as a most favored nation.' Western
nations also pledged economic assistance to Eastern Europe,
particularly to Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, which are in
the process of forming democratic institutions.4
Along with initiating financial assistance programs, CoCom also
reexamined its policies on regulating the export of sensitive
Party, which had ruled since 1956, was then disbanded. Id. During November, the East German
Politburo resigned and the Berlin Wall was opened. Id. In Bulgaria, Todor I. Zhivkov, the country's
communist leader since 1954 resigned. Id. At the same time, the hard-line communist leadership in
Czechoslovakia relinquished control, and Vaclav Havel, leader of the democratic movement, was
elected president. Id. The year ended with only one bloody revolution, when on December 22, the
Rumanian people overthrew Nicolae Ceausescu. N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1990, § A, at 10, col. 3.
During 1990, reform movements gathered momentum, as former despotic nations held free
elections for the frst time since the institution of communism. In March and April, the opposition
United Democratic Front won a majority of the seats in the Hungarian Parliament. Id. In May, Jozef
Antall, of the United Democratic Front, became Prime Minister of Hungary, while the first free
elections since 1937 were held in Rumania. Id. Free elections followed in Bulgaria. Id. A short time
later, the Bulgarian Parliament named Zhelyu Zhelev, leader of the opposition Union of Democratic
Forces, as the country's first non-communist president in 40 years. Id. On August 3, Arpad Goencz,
once condemned to life imprisonment for his role in the 1956 anti-communist uprising, was elected
by Parliament to serve as president of a democratic Hungary. Chicago Tribune, Aug. 4, 1990, at 4,
Zone C. On October 3, West and East Germany united. The year closed with the first Polish
presidential election held in the new democracy. In a run-off election, Lech Walesa, leader of the
group credited with triggering the Eastern European revolution, was elected president. Chicago
Tribune, Dec. 12, 1990, at 24, Zone C.
3. American Banker, June 15, 1990, at 10.
4. N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1990, § I, at 14, col. 1. To assist in the reconstruction of Eastern
Europe, ten billion dollars was granted by 34 nations which established the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development in Eastern Europe. Id.
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technology and industrial goods to Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union.5 In their August round of meetings, CoCom members,
whose past objective was to forestall their adversaries'
technological advancement, suddenly faced an historic opportunity
to encourage reforms by infusing failing Eastern European
economies with advanced technology.
As CoCom deliberated over the ramifications behind the
collapse of the Eastern Bloc, its attention shifted to the third world.
There, as the superpower deterrence system disappeared, a vacuum
had evolved, encouraging the military exploits of desperate leaders.
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, on August 2, 1990, was a stark
example of the new threat to world peace, and the need to refocus
export control laws. As the Iraqi war machine demonstrated,
sophisticated Western and Eastern technology can be extremely
dangerous in the hands of unstable regimes. Therefore, to avoid a
future reoccurrence of the Gulf War, industrial countries must
respond with a safety apparatus to control the flow of dangerous
exports of technology to third world countries.
This comment examines CoCom's possible role in a new world
that is no longer occupied by a bipolar power struggle between
communism and capitalism. Part II traces CoCom's historic
development as well as organizational composition. Part In then
examines the legal status of CoCom's "gentlemen's agreement,"
while part IV explores various philosophies that influence decision
making within CoCom. Part V details the new measures adopted
by CoCom in response to changes in the Soviet and Eastern
European systems. Part VI predicts that reopening European
borders as well as a decline in U.S. economic and technological
power will lead to CoCom's disappearance from the East-West
5. 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 114, 114 (Jan. 24, 1990). According to White House
spokesperson Marlin Fitzwater, "[t]he situation that's changed now, of course, is with the emergence
of these new Democracies in Eastern Europe, or countries moving in that direction at least, and our
interest to help support those countries by additional exports of technology, and by the seeming
change of the military threat from the Soviet Union ... That leads to our addressing this issue, and
why the situation is frankly different today than it was a year ago." Id. Although the U.S. has called
for liberalizing export controls to all CoCom controlled countries, it has singled out specific Eastern
European nations that have moved toward democratic political systems (Poland, Czechoslovakia, and
Hungary) to receive more sophisticated technology. Id.
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export control arena. It then proposes that CoCom's developed and
time-tested methods be redirected towards developing multilateral
cooperation to prevent radical regimes from acquiring dangerous
technology.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Historical Development of CoCom
1. The Formation of CoCom
In the aftermath of the Berlin blockade of 1948, Western leaders
realized that tensions with the Soviet Union would continue well
into the future.' Planning for such a contingency, the U.S. renewed
wartime export restrictions7 and initiated discussions with Western
allies to establish embargo lists against the U.S.S.R. and its satellite
states.8 In 1949, the U.S. proposed the formation of the
Consultative Group, which comprised of export control officials
from various Western nations, who were charged with supervising
export control lists containing regulated items.9 The Consultative
Group served as a policy-setting body. In 1950, CoCom was
created to execute the day-to-day embargo directives, 0 assuming
the policy making responsibility a short time later.1 CoCom
became the deliberative body, where member-nations discussed the
6. Hunt, Multilateral Cooperation in Export Controls-The Role of CoCom, 14 U. ToL L REV.
1285, 1286 (1983).
7. Originally export controls were enacted during World War H as a response to domestic
shortages in basic commodities. Liebman, The Export Administration Amendments Act of 1985, 20
INT'L LAW. 367, 367 (1986). The controls were enacted in 50 U.S.C. app. § 701 as amended June
30, 1942, c. 461, 56 Stat. 463. Id.
8. Id.
9. Berman & Garson, United States Export Controls-Pasg Present, and Future, 67 COLUM.
L REv. 761, 835 (1967). The Consultative Group was established by the United States, United
Kingdom, France, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg. Id. Between 1952-1953 Norway,
Denmark, Canada, and West Germany joined the Group and eventually Portugal, Greece, Turkey,
Japan, and Australia became members as well. Id.
10. Hunt, supra note 6, at 1287.
11. Webster, CoCom: Limitations on the Effectiveness of Multilateral Export Controls, 1983
WIS. INT'L L J. 106, 108 (1983) (presented at the Symposium on U.S. Export Policy on
Technological Transfer).
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types of export control policies they planned to enact in their
respective nations.
CoCom's initial purpose was to restrict the export of goods and
technology which could contribute significantly to the military
potential of "controlled countries,"' 2 and which could adversely
affect the security of member-states. 3 Some writers speculate that
CoCom origihally intended to wage an offensive economic warfare
against the U.S.S.R., and its satellites, at the height of the Cold
War era. 4 Today, the embargo aims to preserve the western
technological lead over Warsaw Pact countries. 5  CoCom
accomplishes this end by restricting the export of "dual use
technology.' ' 16 Since dual use technology is a vague term that
generally includes any technology used for both civilian and
military purposes, and most civilian items may be used by the
military, many disagreements within CoCom revolve around where
to draw the dual use line. According to the United States
government, CoCom controls goods and technology "which are
principally used in peacetime for the development, production or
use of arms; those from which technology of military significance
might be extracted; and those of military significance in which
proscribed destinations have a deficiency."17
CoCom was conceived as a secret and informal agreement, due
12. The countries designated by CoCom as controlled are: Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, Kampuchea, the Mongolian People's Republic, North Korea, the People's Republic of
China, Poland, Rumania, Soviet Union, and Vietnam. Masden, supra note 1, at 197 n.5. See Recent
Developments, Export Controls: New CoCom Measures on High Technology Exports, 29 HARv.
INT'L LJ. 547, 547 n.4 (1988) (listing the controlled countries).
13. Hunt, supra note 6, at 1287-88. Each member of CoCom may independently increase its
own list of controlled countries. Id. Although unsuccessful in including Cuba in the CoCom embargo,
the United States has used economic methods to pressure western countries to treat Cuba as a
controlled country. Berman & Oarson, supra note 9, at 836.
14. Hunt, supra note 6, at 1287-88. CoCom served as the economic arm of the battle to win
the Cold War. Id.
15. Id. at 1288. As Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe waned, the Warsaw Pact ceased to
exist. See Washington Post, Feb. 26, 1991, at A16, § I (signing of declaration, by member nations
of Warsaw Pact, to dismantle "the military organs and structures of the treaty").
16. Webster, supra note 11, at 114. Dual use technology includes "items intended for civilian
use but which also have a potential for military use." 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 94, 94 (Jan. 17,
1990).
17. Hunt, supra note 6, at 1288.
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to concern within NATO over the legality of the peacetime trade
embargo against communist nations.18 Although. CoCom has
remained viable for forty-one years, "no written agreement--treaty,
executive agreement or other constitutive document" has ever been
signed between the members. 9 Instead, agreements dealing with
operations and procedures are codified as footnotes to written
technology control lists.2" As a result of the secret nature of the
pact, exact details of the understanding behind the framework and
workings of CoCom remain unknown.2 Authorities familiar with
CoCom suggest that the organization maintains secrecy in order to
protect participating governments from domestic criticism.'
Policy guidance was provided on an ad hoc basis, during the
early years of the embargo, as representatives to CoCom received
instructions from their respective governments, which also
conducted direct ad hoc consultations with governments interested
in specific CoCom issues.23 CoCom has since developed an
infrastructure which maintains a full time staff. In recent years, the
Committee has held more structured "high-level" meetings where
political-level representatives of member-states have discussed
issues of export policy and practice.24
2. Periods of Adjustment
CoCom's progress throughout the years plots an erratic, yet
constant, course leading towards liberal export controls. At its
inception, CoCom's regulations responded to what was perceived
18. Webster, supra note 11, at 108. Efforts by the United States during the 1980s to legitimize
CoCom by creating a multinational treaty were resisted by Western European delegates claiming that
approval was not possible in their respective parliaments. Masden, supra note 1, at 206 n.58.
19. Bingham & Johnson, A Rational Approach to Export Controls, 57 FoREIoN AFF. 894,904
(Spring 1979).
20. Id. See infra note 47 (discussing the function of control lists).
21. Webster, supra note 11, at 108.
22. Bingham & Johnson, supra note 19, at 904. Some European governments are vulnerable
to criticism from the left, for joining the U.S. in embargos against the communist nations. Id. On the
other hand, the U.S. government is subject to domestic criticism, for acquiescing in the loose controls
by Japan and Western Europe. Id.
23. Hunt, supra note 6, at 1287.
24. Id.
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as a real communist threat.' Member-states, which received
financial aid through the Marshall Plan, were obligated to follow
the U.S. containment strategy adopted to fight the Cold War. To
assure compliance with the embargo, the U.S. enacted the 1951
Battle Act, which threatened to cut off any aid to countries
exporting controlled goods.26 CoCom has since advanced towards
a less restrictive trade policy, with periodic retreats during episodes
of East-West conflict. Through the years, control lists have
fluctuated from a high of 270 items in 1951 (during the Korean
War) to 149 in 1976 (the detente era), to 124 in 1985,27 and most
recently dipping to 78, in response to changes in Eastern
Europe.28
In the 1960s, despite American attempts to limit economic
growth in communist countries, CoCom regulations concentrated
only on limiting military growth.29  The 1970s evidenced a
relaxation of export controls, partly due to the spirit of detente
achieved during the Nixon era.3" During those years, American
policy emulated the more relaxed and pragmatic European and
Japanese trade policy.31 CoCom control lists were not abandoned
though. Instead, member-states frequently utilized an exception
procedure. Under this arrangement, if member-states agreed
unanimously that export of specific items would not jeopardize
their security, products could be exported even if they appeared on
25. Aeppel, The Evolution of Multilateral Export Controls: A Critical Study of the CoCom
Regime, 9 FLETCHER F. 105, 109 (1985).
26. Id. Most of the controlled goods in those days were produced in the United States. Id. The
Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 (known as the Battle Act) denied American financial
aid to any country that allowed export of strategic goods to embargoed nations. Id. This coercive
strategy has since given way to diplomatic maneuvering and persuasion techniques. Id.
27. Id. at 109 n.12.
28.7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) at 835 (June 13, 1990). The latest cuts were made during CoCom's
June 1990 high-level meeting. Id.
29. Webster, supra note 11, at 110. During the 1960s, CoCom agreed to U.S. proposals to
regulate emerging areas of integrated circuits and computers. Root, Trade Controls That Work, 56
FOREIGN POLY 61, 63 (1984). In return, the United States agreed to remove many items of military
technology, which the Soviets already had acquired. Id.
30. Aeppel, supra note 25, at I10.
31. Id. See infra notes 92-102 and accompanying text (discussing Japanese and German export
control policy).
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the control lists.32 Since computers were highly regulated, the
United States, as the leading computer manufacturer, filed the
largest number of requests for exceptions."3 Since the exceptions
were monetarily insignificant most of the granted exceptions only
dealt with low performance computers designed for a clear civilian
use.34 Between 1971-75, at the height of detente, CoCom
approved exceptions reached $590 million, some of which were
never utilized.35 These applications represented less than one
percent of eighty-six billion dollars in exports from CoCom
countries to CoCom proscribed destinations.36
During the early 1980s, the Reagan administration's aggressive
anti-communist strategy intensified the Cold War.37 After a study
of the effects of export controls, CoCom also shifted emphasis in
export controls from manufactured products to critical technology,
including technological components, technology design and
technology manufacture. 3' Due to recent warming of relations
between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., and dramatic changes in
Eastern Europe in the latter part of the 1980s, CoCom is once
again reexamining its export control policies during the 1990s.
Although danger still exists that CoCom will tighten the reigns
32. Webster, supra note 11, at 110-11.
33. Id. at 111 n. 23.
34. Root, supra note 29, at 63.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 64.
37. See Aeppel, supra note 25, at 106. On December 30, 1981, responding to imposition of
martial law in Poland, the United States stopped issuing licenses for export to the Soviet Union of
oil and gas exploration and production equipment as well as transmission and reftning equipment.
Root, supra note 29, at 66. This move reversed the 1977-81 policy of encouraging Soviet energy
exports. Id. The embargo was removed in November 1982, but not before it led to the gas pipeline
crisis, in which Western allies ignored U.S. requests to withhold exports designated for the
construction of the Soviet gas pipeline. Id. at 67. In the 1980s, the Reagan administration reverted
to Cold War policies of "economic containment? Id. The U.S. reverted to strict export control
policies at a time when its leadership in world technology had dipped from leading over 70% of
world technologies in 1974, down to 50% in 1984, with expectations of reaching 30% in 1994.
Aeppel, supra note 25, at 107.
38. Webster, supra note 11, at 112-13. The U.S. and CoCom changed the emphasis of their
control lists to manufacturing technologies critical to military applications following a
recommendation by the Pentagon Defense Science Board, chaired by Fred Bucy. Root, supra note
29, at 64. According to the Bucy special report, even end products could be decontrolled, due to the
difficulty ofreproducing the technology that produced the items. Id. This critical technology approach
was incorporated into 1979 version of the Export Administration Act. Id.
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of control once again, in reaction to future conflicts, this is unlikely
to occur. In the past, CoCom did reverse its reforms several times,
yet the embargo always returned to pre-crisis levels, each time
increasing the scope of reforms. Furthermore, the collapse of the
Eastern Bloc also signifies the most dramatic change seen in the
European continent since CoCom was formed. Therefore, with a
possible exception of the U.S.S.R., tough export control policies are
not likely to be reestablished against the former communist
countries, which are now exhibiting democratic and free market
tendencies. Since the latest changes in Europe also represent a
virtual attainment of CoCom's initial objectives, CoCom may have
reached the end of its function in East-West trade.
B. CoCom's Structure and Operations
1. Organizational Structure
Although CoCom is credited with shaping the export policy of
its seventeen member-nations,39 debate centers around whether the
Committee really has influence beyond providing a symbolic
gesture of member unity. CoCom is divided into three policy
layers. The permanent secretariat, headquartered in Paris, manages
the routine operations of the Committee.4" The thirty members of
the secretariat consist of mid-level diplomats and technical
specialists who meet daily to discuss control lists, and consider
applications for exceptions to the list requirements.41 The mid-
level Executive Committee consists of higher-level government
39. CoCom directives are also respected by other nations, such as Austria, Ireland, and Sweden,
which agree to comply with CoCom policy in order to receive technology from members of CoCom.
Export Controls: New CoCom Measures on High Technology Exports, supra note 12, at 550.
40. Van Genderen, Cooperation on Export Control Between the United States and Europe: A
Cradle of Conflict in Technology Transfer?, 14 N.CJ. INT'L L. & COM. REa. 391, 394 (1989).
CoCom is headquartared in the compound of the American Paris consulate. Id. It operates on a
budget of $500,000, with an office space covering 14,000 square feet. Aeppel, supra note 25, at 116.
41. Webster, supra note 11, at 115. National representatives consider exception requests during
weekly meetings. Id. at 117.
1991 / CoCom: Past, Present, Future
representatives who meet twice a year.42 The supreme policy body
is composed of high-level government officials who meet once a
year to "translate political decisions on licensing rules into
directives for the lower administrative levels.
' 43
2. The Operation of the Committee
Although CoCom is described as an informal "gentleman's
agreement," the organization's infrastructure suggests that the pact
has evolved into far more than a mere forum for informal policy
making. To achieve its objective, CoCom divides its activities into
three tasks: Establishment and updating of control lists; review of
exception requests submitted from member-states; and coordination
of enforcement and administration activities by different CoCom
member governments."
CoCom maintains three embargo lists to guide the export
policies of its members.45 The lists are: International Atomic
Energy List; International Munitions List; and the Industrial List
(containing dual use items not found in the first two lists). 46 These
lists are not published, and the only information available is found
in publications by the respective member-states, once the
suggestions are codified.47 In addition to reviewing control lists
42. Van Genderen, supra note 40, at 394. These officials meet to review and amend technical
control lists. Id.
43. Id.
44. Webster, supra note 11, at 114.
45. Hunt, supra note 6, at 1288-89.
46. Van Genderen, supra note 40, at 395. The International Industrial List is divided into three
subcategories: embargoed items (International List I); quantitatively controlled items (International
List II); and exchange of information and surveillance items (International List III). Id. List I contains
embargoed items which can only be exported once permission is obtained from CoCom. List I
includes: "Metalworking machinery; chemical and petroleum equipment; electrical and power
generating equipment; transportation equipment; electronic and precision instruments; metals,
minerals, and their manufacture; chemicals and metalloids; petroleum products; rubber and rubber
products." Aeppel, supra note 25, at 109 n.9. Items on List II may be exported in limited quantities,
while items on List I require a report to CoCom as to export and intended end use. Van Genderen,
supra note 40, at 395.
47. Id. In the United States the list is adopted by the Commodity Control List, found in 15
C.F.R. § 799.1 Supp. 1 (1990) (which is a part of the Export Administration Regulations). Great
Britain codifies export laws in the Export of Goods (Control) Order of 1989 (EGCO). Section 5 of
the EGCO requires the exporter of goods from the U.K. to provide proof, upon demand from the
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on a regular basis, the Committee also conducts comprehensive list
reviews every three to four years.4 During review deliberations,
participants consider technological advances and the availability of
particular goods or technology to controlled nations from sources
outside of CoCom member-countries.49  Determination of
availability influences the future composition of control lists.
During the high-level review procedure, each member may
submit "original proposals" four months in advance of the
discussions, and "counterproposals" up to forty-five days before
member consideration.5" If two or more members agree, "revised
proposals" may be submitted at any time during the review.5
Any member also may submit a "proposal for consistency,"
covering changes required in order to maintain technical
consistency with other items not under control.52 If an item has
been used commercially in the West for five years or more, an
"original proposal" to decontrol is considered approved unless a
counterproposal is submitted.53
CoCom representatives also meet once a week to review
petitions made by individual businesses seeking one time
exceptions to export prohibitions.54 Each member-state forwards
Commissioners, that exports reached their licensed destination. Id. The EGCO subjects violators of
the export controls to a fine not exceeding two thousand pounds and, or, a prison term not exceeding
two years. Id. at § 6. The Regulations are then divided into separate sections listing the controlled
goods. Schedule 1, Part H Group I contains military aircraft, arms and related material, ammunition,
military stores and appliances, and security and para-military equipment. Id. Group 2 specifies items
related to atomic energy minerals and materials and nuclear facilities, equipment and appliances.
Schedule 1, Part HI Group 3A contains metal working machinery and associated equipment. Id. Group
3B is composed of chemical and petroleum equipment. Id. Group 3C catalogues electrical and power-
generating equipment. Id. Group 3D lists general industrial equipment. Id. Group 3E has aircraft,
spacecraft, marine equipment and ships (other than warships and naval equipment). Id. Group 3F
details electronic equipment including communications and radar and scientific instruments and
apparatus. Id. Group 3G lists controlled electronic equipment including computers, software and
telecommunications equipment, and photographic equipment. Group 3H of Schedule 1, Part II
mentions metals, minerals and their manufacture. Id. Group 31 lists chemicals, metalloids, petroleum
products and synthetic rubber. Id.
48. Hunt, supra note 6, at 1289.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1290.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Hunt, supra note 6, at 1290.
54. Webster, supra note 11, at 117-18.
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to CoCom applications for the export of controlled items which it
deems fit for export.55  Member-states must review each
application and respond within eighteen days.56 Upon reaching a
unanimous vote, CoCom issues a recommendation to the requesting
nation.
Even when CoCom denies an exception request, member-
nations may proceed with a sale if they determine that the
transaction is important to their "national interest." 58  The
requirement of CoCom approval is also blunted by the practice of
member governments which allow export of some items without
submitting to CoCom's review.59 In some instances governments
have even dealt with each other directly, through high level
channels, bypassing the CoCom arrangement.' The British
government chose this method when it decided to sell sophisticated
Harrier jets to China.6
CoCom also serves as a consultative forum for national
enforcement activities."2 To achieve this end, CoCom established
the Subcommittee on Export Controls, which meets periodically to
study member-state enforcement procedures and to suggest ways to
improve security procedures.63
III. LEGAL ISsUES IN CoCoM
A. CoCom's Binding Powers
CoCom does not appear to possess the capacity to enforce
compliance by member-states. In some cases the member-states do
55. Id. CoCom does not deal directly with individual exporters. Id.
56. Id. The states must respond with a full approval, partial approval, or denial of the request.
Id.
57. Id.
58. Webster, supra note 11, at 118 n.52.
59. Id. Many times, fully aware that exceptions would not be approved by CoCom, member-
states do not bring problematic cases for review. Id. at 118 n.52.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 119.
63. Webster, supra note 11, at 119.
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not officially recognize CoCom. 4 Once control lists are agreed
upon within the Committee, member-states convey the regulations
to their respective governments, which enact them into national
law, thus enforcing CoCom regulations on an individual state
level. 5
Since CoCom does not enforce the embargo, the U.S. has at
times attempted to punish violators of the controls by blacklisting
firms exporting goods in violation of CoCom lists." Yet, even
without a formal role in international law, and perhaps for that
reason, CoCom has been described as effective in preventing
shipment of substantial amounts of military hardware and dual use
technology to controlled countries.'
CoCom's past efficiency in accomplishing its task may have
64. Bingham & Johnson, supra note 19, at 904.
65. Webster, supra note 11, at 119-20.
66. Id. at 119 n.55. An example can be seen in Congressional sanctions against Toshiba
Machine Company of Japan, following its violation of Japanese (and CoCom) export regulations.
Between 1980 and 1984, Toshiba sold to the U.S.S.R. sophisticated propeller milling machines.
Comment, Curbing Illegal Transfers of Foreign Developed Critical High Technology From CoCom
Nations to the Soviet Union: An Analysis of the Toshiba-Kongsberg Incident, 12 B.C. INT'L & COMP.
L. REV. 181, 181-82 (1989). In conjunction with the Toshiba sale, Kongsberg Vaapenfabrik of
Norway sold to the Soviets sophisticated computer equipment that made it possible to operate the
Japanese equipment. Id. at 182 n.4. Both the Japanese and Norwegian export regulations follow
guidelines established by CoCom. Id. at 183 n.7. Upset that the Toshiba-Kongsberg sales led to an
enhancement of the Soviet submarine propeller technology, the U.S. Congress passed the Multilateral
Export Enhancement Amendments Act of 1988. Comment, The Toshiba Sanctions Provision: Its
Constitutionality and Impact on CoCom, 1989 B.Y.U. L. REv. 623, 625 n.12 (1989). The 1988 Act
places retroactive sanctions, as well as similar provisions on future violations. Id. at 635. Another
example of American use of extraterritorial power occurred when Piher Semiconductores, a Spanish
firm, was fined one million dollars and received a five year probation along with a suspension of all
import privileges of items from the United States. The firm was convicted of re-exporting $2.4
million worth of electronic test equipment and semiconductors to Cuba and the Soviet Union.
Masden, supra note 1, at 199 n.1 1. Yet, even American enforcement efforts cannot prevent items
from being exported through avenues such as the black market, through which the Soviets receive
exports of advanced computer technology from countries such as Germany and Sweden. Id. American
use of extraterritorial jurisdiction on non-citizens and over acts that occur outside the United States
has been sharply criticized by Western Europeans. 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 137, 137-38 (Feb. 3,
1990).
67. Webster, supra note 11, at 120-121. CoCom has survived during four decades largely due
to its informal, non-binding nature, which has not threatened the independence of its member-states.
Id. At the same time, this informal nature of CoCom has compromised many of the organization's
goals of uniform regulations. Id. See id. at 122-23 (for a discussion of problems contributing to the
ineffectiveness of CoCom, and arguments that CoCom has failed in its main mission, a point evident
by the advanced Russian military and industrial development).
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even rendered the organization's future role obsolete.68 Supporting
this view is the dismal economic condition facing the U.S.S.R. and
Eastern countries, in addition to information that Western military
technology is far more advanced than its Eastern European
counterpart.6 9 To the extent that this result can be attributed to the
embargo, it is important to consider how CoCom managed to
achieve such a dramatic impact, without a legal status or the power
to enforce its decrees. One possibility is that CoCom's members
are philosophically homogeneous.70 However, a more plausible
explanation is that although a formal treaty does not exist, pressure
from member-states (especially the United States) assures a general
adherence to the embargo policy. CoCom has essentially developed
into a de facto binding treaty.
B. Oversight of Member Compliance
Since there is no CoCom "law," the Committee does not police
or investigate member non-compliance. 7' To assure private party
compliance, members of CoCom use the Import
Certificate/Delivery Verification (IC/DV) system.72 The IC/DV is
an export documentation system designed to prevent the reexport
to controlled nations of items traded between CoCom member
nations.73 To comply with the system, an importer must provide
the exporter with a statement, certified by the importing
government, assuring that the importer intends to receive the goods
and that the goods will not be reexported without approval from
68. Freedenberg, CoCom Enters the Post-Cold War Era, presented before the 1990 ABA
section of the International Law & Practice Fall Meeting, San Jose, California (held Dec. 6-8, 1990)
at 14 (quoting from a speech to American Foreign Service Association at Symposium on Export
Controls, U.S. Department of State, at 2 (Washington D.C., Mar. 27, 1990).
69. Id.
70. See infra notes 90-142 and accompanying text (describing the philosophical differences
within CoCom).
71. Hunt, supra note 6, at 1294.
72. Id. In the U.S. the system is codified in 15 C.F.R. § 768 (1990). See 15 C.F.R. § 775 Supp.
No. 1 (1990) (listing the agencies responsible for the implementation of the IC/DV program in other
participating nations).
73. Hunt, supra note 6, at 1294.
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the importing government.74 Thus, the importing country receives
notice of the impending transaction and can enforce the regulations
more effectively. 75 CoCom also exchanges information with
member-states, circulating news about the latest export diversion
hazards and methods of embargo evasion.76 Even though CoCom
appears to successfully operate on a goodwill honor system, the
nonexistence of an enforcement mechanism raises a doubt as to
reasons for the embargo's success.
C. Legality of CoCom in International Law
1. CoCom as a Binding Treaty
CoCom's apparent success in maintaining the embargo suggests
that the "gentlemen's agreement" may possess characteristics
constituting a binding legal understanding. Governments may enter
into detailed and precise agreements for future conduct, while still
preserving the "nonlegal" and non-binding nature of the
agreements.77 Violators of such agreements are not liable for
claims of reparations or other judicial remedies. 7 Yet, "it is
possible and reasonable to conclude that states may regard a non-
binding undertaking as controlling even though they reject legal
responsibility and sanctions. ' 79 Nations entering non-binding
multilateral agreements usually rely on the other parties to execute
their respective obligations.8 " Thus, it is possible that a member-
state challenging the CoCom embargo would be "subject to
estoppel in view of the gentlemen's agreement and the reliance of
the parties on that agreement."'8
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. L HENKiN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACm*BR & H. SMiT, INTRNATIONAL LAW CASES AND
MATERIALS 395 (2d ed. 1987) (quoting Schachter, The Twilight Existence of Nonbinding
International Agreements, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 296 (1977)).
78. Id. at 396.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 395.
81. Id. at 397.
180
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From the inception of the trade embargo, member-states have
adopted CoCom generated "suggestions" into their national laws.
Committee members have not always complied with the spirit or
sometimes the letter of the embargo. But, officially, all signatories
have abided by the agreement. As the Toshiba-Kongsberg incident
demonstrates, participants in the embargo place heavy pressure on
each other to improve their export control enforcement
apparatus.8" Member-states are clearly not free to completely
ignore CoCom and its policies. Thus, members of CoCom rely on
each other to follow the agreement, and would likely apply the
concept of estoppel against member-nations attempting to declare
the embargo non-binding.
2. The Legality of a Peacetime Embargo
Whether or not the export embargo is a product of a binding
agreement, the coercive peacetime economic measures may conflict
with internationally-recognized norms. As a concerted effort,
seventeen of the most technologically advanced nations withhold
goods and technology from their ideological foes, stifling the
latter's economic and military growth. Consequently, Eastern-
European present-day means of communication, computer
technology, and industrial production are years behind their
Western counterparts. If this result were CoCom's ultimate intent,
then the seventeen member-states contravened the United
Nations'(U.N.) Charter, which resolves to promote "higher
standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic
and social progress and development. ' ' 83 The embargo specifically
targets the Eastern economies, affecting the living conditions in
these sovereign states. The Charter also encourages "solutions of
international economic, social, health, and related
82. See 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 134-35 (Feb. 3, 1988) (discussing strengthening of control
programs in Japan and Norway in the aftermath of the Toshiba-Kongsberg case). See also Comment,
Analysis of the Toshiba-Kongsberg Incident, supra note 66, at 185 nn.19-20. (describing new
legislation strengthening export controls in Japan and Norway).
83. U.N. CHARTmR Art. 55, at (a).
The Transnational Lawyer/ Vol. 4
problems ... ."" The U.N. clarified its opposition to economic
coercion in its Twentieth Session, declaring that "[n]o state has the
right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever,
in the internal and external affairs of any other state." 85 The
Declaration cofidemned all political or economic intervention in the
affairs of other states.86 The Declaration further proclaimed that
"[e]very state has an inalienable right to choose its political,
economic, social and cultural systems, without interference in any
form by another state. ' ,87 The CoCom embargo has the effect of
altering the military, economic, and political nature of the
controlled nations. As Eastern European nations have begun to
"westernize" their institutions, CoCom has rewarded their
decisions by lifting the trade embargo. The quick reaction to
changes in Eastern Europe demonstrates that the embargo had the
purpose to directly change the internal affairs of controlled nations.
Thus, as controlled nations comply with western political and
economic standards, the trade embargo against them is repealed.
The embargo's attempt to preserve the inferiority of Eastern
technology, and in effect their economies, opposes U.N.
directives.88
84. Id. at (b).
85. Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the
Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty, 21 GAOR Supp. (No. 14) 1 1 at 11-12 (1965)
reprinted in 2 M. Ku, A COMPREHENSIVE HANDBOOK OF THE UNITED NATIONS 770 (1979)
(emphasis added). See Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
and Cooperation Among States in Accordance With the Charter of the United Nations, 25 GAOR,
Res. 2625 (Oct. 24, 1970) reprinted in ARANcuo-RuIz, THE UN DECLARATION ON FRIENDLY
RELATIONS AND THE SYSTEM OF THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 318 (1979). The Declaration
was approved unanimously and calls for all states to refrain from military, political, economic or any
other form of coercion against the independence of any other state. Id. at 319. (emphasis added).
86. Id.
87. Id. (emphasis added).
88. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) also seeks to eliminate
"'discriminatory treatment in international commerce.- THE GENERAL AoREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND
TRADE, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, A7, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187,
at Preamble. As part of the GAIT protocol, contracting parties agreed to encourage free trade. See
generally id. (detailing the GAIT agreement). Yet, only members of GAIT are protected by the
agreement. Id. at Art. 1. Czechoslovakia is the only member of GAT which is also targeted by
CoCom. Id. at Preamble. Thus, GAT is not a fertile forum for forwarding the end of CoCom
initiated embargos. In addition, GATT provides for an exception to its general open trade provisions,
where such exception is "'necessary for the protection of its essential security interests." Id. at Art.
XXI. Thus, due to GATr's membership requirement, as well as the national security exception,
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On the other hand, CoCom has operated in conjunction with the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 9 which militarily
rivaled the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War. During those years,
export controls served as a guarantee for NATO members' national
security. By preventing the advancement of Eastern technology, the
Western allies "contained" the possible aggression of Warsaw Pact
nations. A direct correlation certainly existed between thriving
Eastern economies and their technologically advanced military. Yet,
NATO and the Warsaw Pact never faced each other on the battle
field. In fact, CoCom operated the embargo largely in peacetime,
attempting to stunt Eastern economies as a contingency for future
conflict.
Had CoCom discouraged the export of military hardware or
specific military related technology, the national security exigency
would have possibly transcended the concept of non-intervention.
Yet, the dual use technology designation for items controlled by
CoCom was very ambiguous. Virtually all manufactured items and
technology have military application. Consequently, members of
CoCom withheld many useful items from the economies of
controlled nations, under the guise of national security.' The
U.S., a leading exporter of technology and an influential force
behind CoCom policies, overtly utilized export controls to achieve
its foreign policy objectives.91 Thus, the CoCom directed embargo
did not serve a purely national security objective. To the extent that
CoCom lists surpassed the minimal national security necessity, they
contradicted basic notions of non-interference in the internal affairs
of sovereign nations. Even if the military threat during the Cold
War was sufficient to justify the overinclusive scope of the
GAIT does not preclude the CoCom trade embargo against the Eastern bloc.
89. Iceland (a member of NATO) is not affiliated with CoCom. Bingham & Johnson, supra
note 19, at 904. Australia (not a member of NATO) joined CoCom in 1989. 6 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 711, 711 (May 31, 1989).
90. Items include simple-use computers, usually available to consumers in the West,
telecommunication technology that would help to link the largest nation in the world, and other items
that are taken for granted by Western consumers.
91. See infra note 106 (discussing U.S. sanctions against the U.S.S.R. in protest of the
Shcharansky affair). See also infra note 143 (discussing U.S. sanctions against the U.S.S.R. in protest
of Soviet treatment of Lithuania).
The Transnational Lawyer/ Vol. 4
embargo, the threat of the Cold War is no longer as real. Where
the threatening Eastern Bloc once stood, a group of nations with
serious economic conditions now stands.
IV. PHILOSOPHICAL DFERENcEs IN CoCoM
A. A Comparison of Export Systems
Although CoCom members faithfully adopt the Committee's
control lists, situations arise in which individual member-states
have discretion to interpret certain ambiguous provisions. In such
instances, each nation's view of the purpose and scope of CoCom
gains importance, and variations in enforcement often occur. Also,
the conflict of views within CoCom may eventually influence the
Committee's survival. In order to illustrate the different
philosophies influencing CoCom, this comment compares the
philosophy behind the export laws of Japan, Germany, Canada, and
the United States.
1. Japan
Japanese law strives to "develop foreign trade, to safeguard the
balance of international payments and the stability of the currency,
and to insure the most economic use of foreign currency funds."92
Japan designed its export control laws with the long-term goal of
eliminating restrictions.93 Japanese export control officials are
responsible for building and improving the economy, rather than
assuring national security.' In 1966, the Japanese Export Control
List tracked 194 items. 95 Of those, 161 originated in the CoCom
92. Baker & Bohlig, The Control of Exports-A Comparison of the Laws of the United States,
Canada, Japan, and the Federal Republic of Germany, 1 INT'L LAW. 163, 171 (1966).
93. Id.
94. Id. Yet, following the embarrassing Toshiba episode, which generated political pressure,
Japan has increased export control personnel from 40 to 103. Administration Officials Hail CoCom
Parley at Success, Citing Progress in Enforcement, 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 134, 135 (Feb. 3,
1988). Thus, according to one U.S. official, "its system can no longer be described as worthless."
Id.
95. Baker & Bohlig, supra note 92, at 181.
184
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control list, while the remaining thirty-three entries included items
in short supply, or appliances restricted in order to achieve quality
control.' Japanese export control laws are, therefore, very limited
in their scope. With the exception of the Japanese-Russian dispute
over the Northern Kurile Islands, Japan does not have strategic
motives comparable to the United States. This fact is reflected in
the Japanese export control law, which makes no provisions for
incorporating foreign policy or national security.' When Japanese
officials interpret CoCom directives, they have the incentive to err
in favor of free trade.
2. Germany
The German parliamentary authorization for export control laws
states that "restrictions are to be limited in nature and scope to the
extent which is necessary to achieve the purposes indicated in the
authorization." 98. .. "[R]estrictions shall be revoked as soon as,
and to the extent that, reasons warranting their introduction no
longer prevail." Since export restrictions must be approved by the
Bundestag, which restricts the regulating power of the executive
branch, German export restrictions are limited in scope." In 1967,
German export control lists included 225 items, virtually all of the
items not selected by CoCom were agricultural products restricted
in order to fulfill Common Market obligations."° Control laws
restricted other items due to short supply or in order to assure
superior quality of exported goods.' With the opening of
Eastern European markets, Germany has great incentive to advocate
a dwindling of CoCom restrictions, perhaps even allowing CoCom
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 173.
99. Id.
100. Baker & Bohlig, supra note 92, at 181. Even when specific CoCom controls have been
violated, the German government has resisted prosecution of violators, or the imposition of
meaningful penalties on those convicted of export crimes. Gaffney, German Profiles Uber Allies,
Wash. Times, Sept. 4, 1990, at CI.
101. Baker & Bohlig, supra note 92, at 181 (giving certain minerals as an example of items in
short supply).
185
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to quietly fade away. Germany's CoCom representative, Joachim
Jahnke, pointed to the German government's proclamation before
th6 Bundestag, "[w]e stick to CoCom -- we will not pull out!"
Jahnke then warned, "[b]-ut CoCom should not ask the impossible.
CoCom will become obsolete if -- but only if -- it fails to adapt to
the new circumstances .... Continued cohesion on the Western
alliance requires that CoCom adapt sufficiently-- and sufficiently
fast-- to stay viable." 1°2 As Germany begins to cooperate
economically with its Eastern neighbors, it will have difficulty
participating in a technological embargo against its new economic
partners.
3. Canada
Canadian law limits export regulations to goods of a "strategic
nature," the export of which is detrimental to Canadian security,
to the implementation of governmental agreements, and to the
assurance of an adequate supply of goods in Canada.'0 3 These
restrictions do not go as far as their U.S. counterpart, which give
the President flexibility to link export control laws with foreign
policy goals.
Following CoCom approval on July 1, 1990, Canada reduced its
Export Control List by approximately forty percent." 4 The
purpose of the change reflects a policy aimed at encouraging
Canadian exporters to participate in the reconstruction of Eastern
Europe. 105
4. United States
Unlike their CoCom counterparts, Americans view trade with
the controlled nations as concessional, benefitting only the other
102. Freedenberg, supra note 68, at 14.
103. Baker & Bohlig, supra note 92, at 170-01.
104. Canada Revises Export Control List to Ease Restrictions on Trade With East Block Nations,
7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1297, 1298 (Aug. 22, 1990).
105. Id.
186
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countries.'06 As a result, the U.S. has utilized export regulations
to further national security and foreign policy, as opposed to
attempting to promote free trade. 07
In the past, the U.S. strictly enforced the embargo against
controlled nations, going beyond CoCom recommended control
lists. 08 In 1967, over 625 categories of goods required a license
in order to be exported to a controlled nation.t 9 Only 161 of
those categories were taken from CoCom lists.11 In 1968, the
United States restricted the export of 1100 items which were
available to controlled countries from other CoCom members."'
Due to strict enforcement of export control regulations in the
United States, American exporters have lost many contracts to
European competitors, who were subject to fewer restrictions." 2
106. Aeppel, supra note 25, at 106. Europeans view trade with the Soviet Union as essential and
beneficial both economically and politically. Id. In 1978, in response to Soviet treatment of dissident
Anatoly Shcharansky, the arrest of American businessman Jay Crawford and the harassment of
American journalists, President Carter adopted unilateral U.S. controls on oil and gas exploration and
production equipment, as a tool for his foreign policy. Root, supra note 29, at 64. The United States
consequently denied an export license for a computer sought by the Soviet news agency TASS, in
response to the Shcharansky trial. Id. at 65. Even after the U.S. sought allied support for its foreign
policy actions, France chose to circumvent previously agreed upon CoCom controls and sold a more
powerful computer to TASS. Id. This action was an example of French resolve not to apply export
controls in foreign policy. Id. The Shcharansky affair marked a change in American policy, which
strained relations with its allies. Id. Prior to 1978, most controversies within CoCom involved the
strategic value of specific equipment. Id. The shift in U.S. policy under the Carter administration
created open controversy and allied disharmony in questions of East-West economic relations. Id.
107. Baker & Bohlig, supra note 92, at 170. Export regulations also serve to protect the domestic
supply of materials in the United States. 15 C.F.R. § 777.15 (1990). See 15 C.F.R. § 399.1 Supp. No.
1 (1990) (discussing categorical grouping of countries along with control restrictions applied to the
countries).
108. Berman & Garson, supra note 9, at 848-49. Strict adherence to export licensing was fueled
by Congressional hostility to U.S. exports to communist countries. Id. Thus, even when the Executive
branch attempted to increase trade with Eastern Europe, control officials who made daily licensing
decisions erred on the cautious side rather than allowing too many risky items to be exported to
controlled nations. Id.
109. Baker & Bohlig, supra note 92, at 179.
110. Id.
111. Masden, supra note 1, at 199 n. 15.
112. Aeppel, supra note 25, at 107. Since the U.S. and other members of CoCom differ at times
over the meaning of technology of strategic significance, many times clients who are refused access
to American goods (which are considered essential to national security) find similar technology
elsewhere. Id. This was found to be true whn the U.S. government refused to sell sophisticated
Boeing 767s to Ethiopia, a communist controlled nation not found on the CoCorm list. Id. The sale
was blocked because the planes contained gyroscope technology. Id. As a result, the Ethiopians
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U.S. exporters were displaced of an estimated nine billion dollars
a year as a result of unilateral U.S. export controls."' Critics of
the American approach point to the fact that Eastern European
purchasers also lost faith in the reliability of American companies,
whose exports are subject to the political whims of elected
officials." 4 Controlled nations, therefore, recognize that any
political event may close the doors to American exports. They are
thus careful not to purchase items which may get caught in U.S.
export bureaucracy, or for which a reliable supply of replacement
parts is not assured. American industrial leaders also blame
declines in U.S. exports on extensive deliberations that occur
among the Departments of State, Commerce, and Defense, which
have "unnecessarily slowed, and often stymied, the licensing
process." 11
5
a. The Export Administration Act
The U.S. Congress authorizes export controls through the Export
approached a French company that sold them an airplane carrying the same technology. Id.
113. 136 Cong. Rec. E365, Extensions of Remarks, (remarks by Congressman Frenzel (R-Minn.)
(introducing revisions to the export control laws) (Feb. 26, 1990). Cf. 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 836,
837 (June 13,1990). According to Representative Sam Gejdenson (D-Conn.), Chairman of the House
Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade, American companies lose
between $10-15 billion. Id.
114. 136 Cong. Rec. S 1101, Extensions of Remarks, (remarks by Senator Riegle speaking on
behalf of the Export Facilitation Act of 1990 (Feb. 26, 1990)). See 136 Cong. Rec. E 365 (remarks
by Congressman Frenzel (R-Minn.) introducing revisions to the export control laws) (Feb. 26, 1990)
(speaking of the annual loss of revenue to United States). According to William Root, former
Director of the State Department's Office of East-West Trade, the unilateral export controls by the
United States hamper serious agreements for multilateral controls, and result in the strengthening of
the Soviet military. Masden, supra note 1, at 199 n.15 (citing Root, supra note 29, at 62).
115. 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 651,651-52 (May 9, 1990). American businesses have always
complained that the strict export laws have hindered their ability to be active in potentially lucrative
markets. Export Controls- U.S. Policies and Procedures Regarding the Soviet Union, United States
General Accounting Office, Fact Sheet for the Chairman, Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate, at 18
(May 1990). Due to the difficulty of receiving export licensing for products and for parts, many
Soviet companies have turned to other markets for products such as oil, gas, and construction
equipment. Id. Other comments deal with the concerns that before strict measures took effect in the
U.S., in the late 1970s and 1980s, some American companies commanded large shares of Soviet
markets, such as oil and gas exploration and production equipment. Much of that market advantage
has disappeared during the 1980s. Id.
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Administration Act of 1979 (EAA). 6 Congress first enacted the
EAA in 1969, to guide American export controls.1 7 It was
reapproved as the Export Administration Act of 1979 and amended
in 1981, 1985, 1988, and most recently in 1990."'
The EAA divides export items into three categories of licenses:
the general license, the specific license, and the special license.'19
The Department of Commerce's decision to place an export item
into either a general or a specific license category depends on the
individual item to be exported and the intended destination within
the controlled country. 2 ° A party wishing to export an item must
116. The Export Administration Act of 1979 is codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-
20 (1981). The Department of Commerce, with the cooperation of the Department of Defense and
the State Department, maintains specific export regulations. Van Genderen, supra note 40, at 399.
The U.S. Customs authorities enforce the regulations, while the Department of State is the primary
American negotiating agency at CoCom meetings. Hunt, supra note 6, at 1290. The State Department
receives advice from the Departments of Commerce and Defense as well as other agencies with
interest or expertise in strategic export controls. Id. During the list review process, the State
Department is reinforced with a technical staff from the Department of Commerce and other agencies
that make up the delegation to CoCom sessions. Id. Many of these groups are organized into
interagency Technical Task Groups which evaluate information dealing with various types of
equipment and technology. Id. The Technical Task Groups are in charge of reviewing additions and
deletions to CoCom control lists. Id. They get information from Government Advisory Committees
which are organized by the Department of Commerce to provide guidance in carrying out the EAA.
Id.
117. Pub. L. No. 91-184, 83 Stat. 841 (1969) (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-13). The
Export Administration Act of 1969 was enacted as a result of the American need for foreign markets,
as it abolished export controls on all American goods available in foreign markets, except those found
to specifically affect U.S. security interests. Aeppel, supra note 25, at 110.
118. See Export Facilitation Act of 1990, Report by Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of
Representatives Report 101-482, 101st Congress, 2nd Session (May 10, 1990) (accompanying H.R.
4653, which is the official proposed bill introducing the Export Facilitation Act of 1990). The Export
Facilitation Act of 1990 was approved by Congress on October 26, 1990, and remains in affect until
June 30, 1992. 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1636, 1636 (Oct. 31, 1990).
119. 15 C.F.R. §§ 371-373 (1985). See also 15 C.F.R. § 385 (1985) (discussing categorical
grouping of countries along with control restrictions applied to those countries).
120. Masden, supra note 1, at 201. There is no need to apply for a general license, which allows
the export of certain items found in the Control List. See id. at 201. The G-Com general license was
enacted in 1988. The G-Com does not require a validated license for the export of certain goods to
CoCom nations. Id. Written approval from the Commerce Department is necessary before an item
can be reexported to a non-CoCom country. Id. A specific license requires an individually validated
permit for each item being exported. 15 C.F.R. § 372(b) (1984). The distribution license was created
in order to simplify and hasten the export license procedure. Masden, supra note 1, at 201. This
license authorizes multiple shipments of a single controlled item to approved buyers in specified
countries for a one year period. Masden, supra note 1, at 203. Thus, exporters do not have to re-
apply for a license with each identical transaction. Id. at 203. See also Letterman, United States
Regulation of High Technology Exports, 20 INT'L LAw. 1147-84 (1986) (providing an in-depth
The Transnational Lawyer/ Vol. 4
refer to the codified version equivalent of the EAA, which is found
in the Export Administration Regulations (EAR).' The
Commodity Control List," found within the EAR, identifies the
specific items subject to controls, as well as the type of restrictions
placed on their export. 23 Violators of the EAA or the EAR are
subject to criminal prosecution by the U.S. Attorney General or to
civil litigation and fines by the Department of Commerce.'24
In the EAA of 1979, Congress approved the use of export
control laws to achieve foreign policy goals."2 Prior t9 that date,
export control laws primarily served national securityand supply
shortage goals.'26 In 1985, amendments to the EAA added the
requirement that the Commodity Control List be reviewed annually,
and that these reviews include an evaluation of at least one third of
description of the export licensing process).
121. The EAR is codified in 15 C.F.R. § 768-799 (1990). The Department of Commerce reacts
to changes from CoCom, Congress, and the Administration by constant revision to the EAR.
Letterman, supra at 120, at 1147-51. See id. at 1151 n.5 (giving a detailed list of revisions made to
the EAR as a reiult of reviews and amendments by CoCom).
122. 15 C.F.R. pt. 799, Supp. No. 1 (1990).
123. The Control List is found in § 399.1 of the EAR. Letterman, supra at 120, at 1147-51. A
general guide to the use of the Control List is found in § 399.1(0 of the EAR. Supplement I to the
EAR, at § 391.2 has Department of Commerce interpretation of the categorization of certain
commodities within the Control List. Id. The Control List is divided into ten general groups
(numbered 0-9): (0) Metalworking machinery; (1) chemical and petroleum equipment; (2) electrical
and power-generating equipment; (3) general industrial equipment; (4) transportation equipment; (5)
electronics and precision equipment; (6) metals, minerals, and their manufactures; (7) chemicals,
metalloids, petroleum products, and related materials; (8) rubber and rubber products; (9)
miscellaneous. Id. Each Control List entry is preceded by a four-digit Export Control Commodity
Number (ECCN) and a code letter. The first letter indicates the strategic level of control, the second
identifies the Group to which the item belongs, and the last two digits identify other related items
within the Group. Id. at 1157. The four digits are followed by a code letter, indicating the types of
documents required as well as the level of imposed control. Id. See id. at 1160 (explaining the system
of classifying countries into controlled and other categories for export licensing determination).
124. 15 C.F.R. § 387 (1986). The most recent version of the Export Facilitation Act of 1990
increases the maximum prison sentence allowed from ten to twenty years, and the maximum fine
from one to two million dollars. Export Facilitation Act of 1990, Report by Committee on Foreign
Affairs, House of Representatives Report 101-482, 101st Congress, 2nd Session (May 10, 1990)
(accompanying H.R. 4653, the official proposed bill introducing the Export Facilitation Act of 1990).
125. Liebman, supra note 7, at 368. The EAA of 1979 reflected concerns from the business
community, and for the first time imposed a time frame within which the Commerce Department had
to process export license applications. Id. at 369 (citing 50 U.S.C. app. 2409).
126. Id.
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the CoCom list. 7
The Export Facilitation Act of 1990 (EFA) enacted the most
recent amendments to the EAA. 2 As its objective, the EFA sets
out to: Limit bureaucratic wrangling and inefficiency, maintain the
effectiveness of CoCom, ensure that the Commodity Control List
keeps pace with technological advances, and promote government
accountability and due process.'"
The EFA creates a license-free CoCom, allowing unrestricted
trade between member-states. 3 The Act requires the U.S. to
propose to CoCom a decontrol of goods and technology which are
rated below the technical sophistication of the China Green
Line.13 The U.S. must also seek to achieve a favorable
consideration for items rated less favorably than the China Green
Line for civil end use *to Eastern European countries.3 These
countries qualify for the relaxation in controls provided they do not
have designs adverse to the U.S. or CoCom member-states, and
that they have established safeguards to protect against diversion
of the goods."3 The U.S. must also recommend that CoCom
establish a case-by-case review of goods and technology rated less
127. Id. at 371. The 1985 Act dealt with the problem of foreign availability of U.S. controlled
goods. Id. It partially shifted the burden of proof to the Commerce Department, requiring the
Secretary of Commerce to attempt the elimination of foreign availability of controlled goods by
negotiating with the governments of countries involved. Id. at 372.
128. See Export Facilitation Act of 1990, Report by Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of
Representatives Report 101-482, 101st Congress, 2nd Session (May 10, 1990) (accompanying H.R.
4653, which is the official proposed bill introducing the Export Facilitation Act of 1990).
Deliberations over the Export Facilitation Act of 1990 started in 1989. The 1990 Act was criticized
by the Bush administration, for going too far in liberalizing export controls, without preserving the
President's flexibility to respond to "evolving national security and foreign policy issues." 7 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 651, 651 (May 9, 1990).
129. Export Facilitation Act of 1990, Report by Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of
Representatives Report 101-482, 101st Congress, 2nd Session, at 2 (May 10, 1990) (accompanying
H.R. 4653, the official proposed bill introducing the Export Facilitation Act of 1990).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 2-3. The China Green Line is a preferred level of export classification currently
enjoyed by the People's Republic of China. Id. Export of items placed on the China Green Line only
require formal notification to other CoCom members. Turza & Essaye, The Changing World of
Export Controls, N.Y.LJ., Aug. 2, 1990, at 5.
132. Export Facilitation Act of 1990, Report by Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of
Representatives Report 101-482, 101st Congress, 2nd Session, at 2-3 (May 10,1990) (accompanying
H.R. 4653, the official proposed bill introducing the Export Facilitation Act of 1990).
133. Id.
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favorably then the China Green Line for civil end use designated
for the Soviet Union and the other Eastern European nations. 34
The EFA removes all items from the Commodity Control List by
October 1, 1992, unless justification exists to reinstate them. The
Act sets guidelines for distinguishing between dual use items which
are regulated by the Department of Commerce (under the EAA)
and those regulated by the State Department (munitions under the
Arms Export Control Act135). The EFA also clarifies when the
Secretary of Commerce must consult with the Secretary of Defense
in the exporting license process.1 36 The EFA increases criminal
penalties for willful violations of export laws and provides for
judicial review of government decisions under the EAA.t37
b. Procedure for receiving export licenses in the U.S.
Prior to the export of specified items, the Department of
Commerce must review the applications requesting the export
license.' If an item could potentially affect national security, the
Department of Defense also reviews the forms. 139 In the event
that neither agency can decide whether to approve the request, the
134. Id. This will assure that truly non-military items will not summarily be placed on control
lists.
135. The United States Munitions List is found in 22 C.F.R. § 121.01 (1990).
136. Export Facilitation Act of 1990, Report by Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of
Representatives Report 101-482, 101st Congress, 2nd Session, at 2-3 (May 10, 1990) (accompanying
H.R. 4653, the official proposed bill introducing the Export Facilitation Act of 1990).
137. Id.
138. Section 4 of the EAA grants specific authority to the Secretary of Commerce to administer
and expand trade. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2403(a) (1970). See Export Controls- U.S. Policies and
Procedures Regarding the Soviet Union, United States General Accounting Office, Fact Sheet for the
Chairman, Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate, at 6-7 (May 1990) (listing the items in the
Commodity Control List).
139. Export Controls-U.S. Policies and Procedures Regarding the Soviet Union, United States
General Accounting Office, Fact Sheet for the Chairman, Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate, at 7
(May 1990). If the U.S. government approves the export of an item which is covered by a CoCom
list, the application is submitted to CoCom for an exception. Hunt, supra note 6, at 1292. See Berman
& Garson, supra note 9, at 844. (describing the "'case method" used by the Office of Export Control
in reviewing specific license applications). The Export Administration Act gives the Department of
Defense a certain veto power over security cases. Root, supra note 29, at 80. If the President of the
United States chooses to override such a veto, he must notify Congress, which is unlikely, since such
action would create the impression that the President is not in full control of his own govenment.
Id.
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application is sent through an interagency review process. 140 The
Export Advisory Review Board, chaired by the Secretary of
Commerce, reviews the application if a conflict of views
persists.14 ' As a last resort, the President of the United States
decides the issue.
41
c. Views in the United States
American views of the role of export controls are primarily
advanced by two groups: the Department of Commerce, supported
by industrial leaders, and the Department of Defense. The
Department of Commerce urges the need for international
competitiveness, as an essential element of technological and
military superiority. The Department of Defense, on the other hand,
maintains that withholding technology from certain controlled
nations is still essential to national security. With a thaw in the
Cold War and a rising trade deficit, U.S. business is gathering
considerable support for open-trade policies. This suggests that
CoCom's founder and most committed member will no longer
serve as the organization's binding force in the future.
Of the four countries examined, only the United States furthers
foreign policy objectives through the use of export controls. 43
This U.S. policy can partly be attributed to the fact that exports
account for twenty to forty percent of the gross national products
of most CoCom nations, while only eight percent of U.S. gross
140. Export Controls-U.S. Policies and Procedures Regarding the Soviet Union, United States
General Accounting Office, Fact Sheet for the Chairman, Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate, at 7
(May 1990).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. An example of the attitude that economies should be used to further political goals was seen
in May 1990, when Senator Alfonse M. D'Amato (R-N.Y.) introduced legislation aimed at
prohibiting the Bush administration from liberalizing export controls for items sold to the U.S.S.R.,
until the Soviets end their harsh treatment of Lithuania and begin talking about Lithuanian
independence. 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 651, 652 (May 9, 1990). In a speech to the Senate, Senator
D'Amato claimed that "[w]e can say to [Soviet President Mikhail] Gorbachev, if you end your
economic aggression against Lithuania, we will reward you at the end of that process with a most-
favored-nation status and, yes, we will change the rules as they relate to CoCom and you will be
entitled to the kinds of materials, the kinds of sensitive equipment, the kinds of technology that you
have never heretofore had." Id.
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national product.1" Philosophical differences within CoCom also
serve as a reminder that each member-state has its own agenda. As
relations with the Soviet Union improve, and Eastern Europeans
develop economic ties with the West, pressure within CoCom to do
away with export controls will increase.
V. RECENT CHANGES
A. Latest CoCom Directives
Acknowledging pressure from other CoCom member-states, on
May 2, 1990, the Bush administration announced plans to seek a
liberalization of export controls at the next Committee meeting. 145
The recommended changes affect the sale of computers,
telecommunications equipment and machine tools, which, according
to the Bush administration, include items deemed "of low strategic
value." 146
On June 6-8, 1990, CoCom met in Paris, and discussed the
Bush administration proposals to substantially reduce CoCom
control lists, reflecting the changing nature of the Warsaw Pact
strategic threat.1 47 At the instigation of the United States, CoCom
agreed to reduce the categories controlled by the embargo list as a
first step in the modernization of the multilateral export control
system.141 Member-states also agreed to scrap the Industrial List
and replace it with a newly devised "Core List, ' 1 49 containing
144. Webster, supra note 11, at 111.
145. 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 648, 648 (May 9, 1990).
146. Id.
147. FactSheet On U.S. Core List Proposal To CoCom, Released by U.S. Commerce Department
Oct. 1, 1990. 7 Int'l Tade Rep. (BNA) 1526 (October 3, 1990). Even though great support exists in
the United States for liberalization of export controls, opposition persists. According to Frank J.
Gaffney Jr., a former senior Pentagon official and now director of the conservative Center for
Security Policy, -[i]t is high time Congress provided some adult supervision over the Bush
administration's systematic dismantling of vital controls governing the transfer of militarily relevant
technologies to Moscow." 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 648, 649 (May 9, 1990).
148. 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1526 (Oct. 3, 1990).
149. The CoCom control list contained between 130,000 to 140,000 controlled products. Los
Angeles Times, July 23, 1990, Part D, at 6, col. I. The new Core List reduces the list to between
8,000 to 10,000 commodities. Id.
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strategic commodities and technologies.15 0
CoCom deliberations resulted in a removal of thirty of the 116
designations from the control list, with plans to remove eight
additional categories in the future."' 1 CoCom also downgraded
certain items to the preferred China Green Line.1 52 The seventeen
member-states then agreed to meet again, allowing each country to
propose a new version of the "Core List.' 153 Member-states also
decided to relax controls for exports traded with Czechoslovakia,
Hungary and Poland, provided that their strategic postures favor
Western interests. 154 In return, the three formerly embargoed
countries must develop control systems to prevent diversion of
150. 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1526 (Oct. 3, 1990). The June 6-8 meeting set up a timetable
according to which member-states were to submit any proposals for the new core list by October 15,
1990. 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1638 (Oct. 31, 1990). In its suggestions for the new core list, the
United States sought to preserve strategic items believed to be essential to current Soviet military
needs. 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1526 (Oct. 3, 1990). The United States proposed to keep on the list
items previously controlled by CoCom which are used in missile and chemical weapon development
or nuclear proliferation. Id. The United States core list proposal consists of eight categories of
strategically critical items: Group 1- Electronics design, development and production; Group 2-
Materials and materials processing; Group 3- Telecommunications (7 Int'l Trade Rep. 1638); Group
4- Sensors, sensor systems and lasers (7 Int'l Trade Rep. 1526); Group 5- Navigation and avionic
systems; Group 6- Marine technology; Group 7- Computers (7 Int'l Trade Rep. 1638); Group 8-
Aerospace and propulsion Equipment. 7 Int'l Trade Rep. 1526.
151. CoCom Agrees to Rewrite Export Rules "From Scratch,"U.S. Officials Report,7 Int'l Trade
Rep. 835, 835 (June 13, 1990) (measures taking effect July 1, 1990). According to Secretary of State,
James Baker, this will affect approximately 80% of all exports currently subject to CoCom
regulations. 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 662, 662 (May 9, 1990).
152. Turza & Essaye, supra note 131, at 5. The four control list items lowered to the China
Green Line are related to: "equipment to manufacture or test high-technology memory and switching
devices; electronic equipment for testing, measuring or for microprocessor/microcomputer
development; analog-to-digital and digital-to-analog Converters, position encoders and transducers;
and fibrous and filamentary materials. 55 Fed. Reg. 26655 (June 29, 1990).
153. 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 835, 835 (June 13, 1990). The Core List consists of eight
categories of items. See supra note 150 (listing the categories as released by the United States).
According to Robert Price, Director ofthe CoCom Office at the Department of State, the new Core
List will not go into effect in CoCom member-states until April or May of 1991. 7 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 1700, 1700 (Nov. 7, 1990).
154. Turza & Essaye, supra note 131, at 5. The new CoCom country classification divides
Eastern Europe into a number of license levels. Los Angeles Times, July 23, 1990, Part D, at 6, col.
1. The core list removes controls from most items destined to the former East Germany. Id. Largely,
most applications for items exported to Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary will be approved under
a liberal license treatment. Id. The U.S.S.R., Albania, and a number of other countries, will still
receive a tougher review, with most items going through the CoCom approval process. Id. The new
regulations liberalize controls to all nations, with the exceptions of Cuba, Vietnam, North Korea,
Libya, and Cambodia. Id.
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technology to proscribed destinations, as well as sever intelligence
contacts with proscribed countries.155
The resulting changes in the control lists affect most export
areas, except sensitive items that are important to national
security.156 Controlled categories remaining on the CoCom
control list include: Missile technology, sophisticated computer
systems (such as equipment on the Intel 486 standard), and certain
telecommunications technology (such as systems with a
transmission capacity of 156 megabytes per second). 57
B. Resulting Changes in the United States
The Bush administration currently plans to maintain U.S.
controls at the CoCom level, rather than to attempt a unilateral
export policy. This approach will promote U.S. exporter's
competitiveness in the world market. 151
The new policy has already engendered changes in export
control laws in the U.S. Reacting to revisions of the CoCom
Industrial List, the Commerce Department amended the Commodity
Control List on June 29.159 On August 31, 1990, the Commerce
Department clarified and revised additional items on the
Commodity Control List. ' 60 On November 27, 1990, the
Commerce Department announced the establishment of the General
155. Turza & Essaye, supra note 131, at 5.
156. 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 835, 835-36 (June 13, 1990). See id. at 836 (listing items to be
removed from the CoCom list as of July 1, 1990).
157. Id.
158. The June 1990, changes CoCom made to the control list affect three main product areas:
Computers, machine tools, and telecommunications. 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 835, 835 (Juno 13,
1990). The reforms are expected to increase exports for all CoCom members, with a 50% change in
American exports over the previous year, and a reduction of 85% of all export license applications.
Id.
159. 55 Fed. Reg. 26652 (June 29, 1990). The United States removed only 22 of the 30 items
recommended by CoCom. 55 Fed. Reg. 26656 (June 29, 1990). Approximately three items remained
due to missile technology non-proliferation concerns and five items due to nuclear non-proliferation
purposes. 1d.
160. 55 Fed. Rep. 35828 (Aug. 31, 1990).
196
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License G-Temp, which replaced the General Licenses GTE."'
The G-Temp temporarily permits the export of certain commodities
for up to one year, without the need to register with the Office of
Export Licensing (OEL) 62 The Commerce Department also
announced the creation of the General License GDR (German
Democratic Republic), which eliminated licensing requirements for
items traded with East Germany, as the former Soviet satellite fully
integrated into the Federal Republic of Germany. 63 To ease trade
between CoCom member-states, the Commerce Department also
initiated the General License GCT, which will purportedly
eliminate the need for up to eighty percent of the licenses issued
in 1989 for intra-CoCom trade.) 4
VI. COCOM IN THE FUTURE
Major differences exist in the way Americans and their CoCom
counterparts view the purpose of export controls. During the early
years of the CoCom embargo, West Europeans participated in the
American vision of export controls because the Marshall plan was
more important to them than trade with the East. 65 Yet, when
Western European economies revived, the U.S. lost much of the
leverage it had in the organization."6
Since Europeans view trade as essential to both their economic
and national security, they have consistently fought to liberalize
control lists. With the impending collapse of the communist bloc
and the possible decline of the Soviet Union as a threat to
European security, in the future the United States will have
161. General License G-Temp, 55 Fed. Reg. 49274 (Nov. 27, 1990) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R.
§ 771.22). The General License GTE authorized temporary exports for certain purposes such as
exhibition, demonstration, inspection and testing, and requires prompt return to the country of export.
15 C.F.R. §§ 772, 774, 786, 790, 799.
162. General License G-Temp, 55 Fed. Reg. 49274 (Nov. 27, 1990) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R.
§ 771.22).
163. 55 Fed. Reg. 26654 (June 29, 1990). The former German Democratic Republic is no longer
subject to CoCom restrictions.
164. 55 Fed. Reg. 25083 (June 20, 1990).
165. Bingham & Johnson, supra note 19, at 906-07.
166. Id. at 906.
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difficulty convincing CoCom participants that peacetime embargos
against Eastern countries are still necessary.167 As former Soviet
satellites turn away from communism and attempt to embrace
Western style market economics, denial of technology needed to
support the changes will also conflict with CoCom's goal of
preserving Western institutions. Thus, at the very least, CoCom will
be forced to make major policy changes, reevaluating its role in a
new political world structure.1'
It is also possible that when the political dust settles, if the
Soviet "revolution" is realized, the organization's Cold War goals
will no longer be relevant, and CoCom will fade away from East-
West trade relations.169 This hypothesis, naturally, depends on the
167. Although the United States has made it clear that Eastern European countries would receive
most of the benefits of liberalized export controls, it is apparent that if the Soviet Union moves
towards a market economy, and its political institutions "democratize," it will be in the interest of
the U.S. to extend export concessions to the U.S.S.R. As Commerce Secretary, Robert Mosbacher
predicted on September 17, 1990, the Soviet Union is likely to become "more like the U.S.,"
pointing to the possibility of a Soviet federal system, he said "it's like sitting in Philadelphia in the
1780s." 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1429, 1429 (Sept. 19, 1990). Mosbacher also pointed to Soviet
support for the United States in the Iraq crisis as a reason for the willingness of the United States to
help the Soviet Union economically. Id.
168. E. Allen Wendt, senior representative for strategic technology policy at the State Department
has commented about the June 1990 CoCom meeting, "[w]e are turning CoCom on its head." 7 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 835, 835 (June 13, 1990). According to Wendt, by honoring the pledge made by
leaders of the Group of Seven industrialized countries, to encourage East European political and
economic reforms, "CoCom is playing its part by giving those countries access to the technology
they need to modernize their economies." Id. at 836.
169. According to John Yochelson, Director of International Business and Economic Affairs at
the Center for Strategic and International Studies, "[t]he Europeans have made it clear they want to
reach out to Eastern Europe." Trade Tensions Between the U.S., Europe Seen Rising over Controls
On Sensitive Exports, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. 119, 119 (January 24, 1990). "The United States, for
national security reasons, is likely to want to slow the pace of that," according to Mr. Yochelson.
Id. Yochelson also pointed to recent legislation in the German Parliament which, according to him,
proposed that "CoCom be virtually gutted." Id. Germany has also made large efforts to dismantle
many of the past decade's export controls, citing to reduced tensions with the Soviet Union and the
need to rebuild East European economies. Gaffney, German Profiles UberAllies, Wash. Times, Sept.
4, 1990, at C1. Cf. 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 835, 836 (June 13, 1990) (citing Allen Wendt of the
State Department as saying the German export control laws are the "toughest laws in CoCom");
Genscher: Stricter Export Laws Will Follow Elections, The Week in Germany, Nov. 30, 1990, at 2.
German Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher stated that starting March 1, 1991, all German
companies will be required to designate one employee to enforce export control laws. Yet, the thrust
of Genscher's comments focused on German export of items dealing with the "manufacture of
weapons of mass destruction," which does not necessarily affect German trade with Eastern European
nations. Id.
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way the Soviet Union resolves its internal struggle, which threatens
to reverse many of the newly realized reforms.
Another development which is likely to influence CoCom's
future is the recent crisis in the Middle East, which highlights the
problem created by proliferation of both dual use and military
technology in third-world nations. In order to prevent third-world
leaders from achieving their political and economic goals by
military means, the entire community of industrialized nations will
have to cooperate in the future. Although the North-South
relationship may be more complicated than the East-West rivalry,
CoCom still must shift its concentration to guarding against the
radical and volatile ambitions of third world regimes."' As the
Iraqi use of Soviet, American, and European technology has
indicated, in order to truly succeed in the non-proliferation of
nuclear and military technology, CoCom must solicit the
cooperation of China, Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union. To
achieve this cooperation, CoCom must either adapt by including its
former adversaries, or perish all together, for a lack of purpose in
a new world order.
VII. CONCLUSION
In order to predict the future of export controls in CoCom's
seventeen member-nations, it is important to understand the original
intent of the trade embargo, as well as its present day function.
CoCom was organized during an era of bipolar rivalry between the
U.S. and the U.S.S.R. It was utilized by the Western Alliance as
the economic weapon against the "communist menace." Yet, even
during those tense times, members of CoCom disagreed about the
nature of the sanctions. While the U.S. used the embargo to
170. In the wake of the Iraq crisis, the Bush administration considered, among a number of
options, ideas to expand CoCom to curb the global spread of advanced weapons. Wash. Times, Sep.
6, 1990, at A7, Part A. According to Michael Liikala, Director of the 10-state Western Regional
Bureau of Export Administration, -[o]ur problem in the 1990s will be to prevent high-tech and
nuclear products from falling into the hands of warring Third World countries, especially those that
are not among the 126 signatories to the non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty.' Los Angeles
Times, July 23, 1990, Part D, at 6, col. 1.
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advance its foreign affairs agenda, other members confined the
economic restrictions to national security interests. Today, with the
dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, and democratization in Eastern
Europe, communism no longer threatens the Western way of life.
Also, the U.S. is no longer the leading producer of technology.
Therefore, as the U.S. continues to lose its economic influence over
members of CoCom, the trade embargo against the East will likely
vanish. In the event CoCom continues to operate, the question of
the legality of a peacetime trade embargo will likely gain
prominence. Controlled nations will likely argue that members of
CoCom interfere with the internal affairs of sovereign nations, and
therefore violate international norms.
Uzzi 0. Raanan
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